Nostr 创始人:Drivechain才是比特币的未来
I. 引言
II. 什么是 Nostr
III. Nostr 去中心化社交协议的爆火
IV. Nostr 创始人对比特币扩容方案 Drivechain 的高度认可
V. 总结
I. 引言
2022 年底，一个名为 Nostr 的去中心化社交协议在整个 Web3 行业引起了轰动。Nostr 全称是 Notes and Other Stuff Transmitted by Relays，是一个于 2020 年启动的去中心化社交网络开源协议。项目创始人 Fiatjaf 也是比特币和闪电网络的开发者。
Nostr 的创新之处在于，它是一个完全去中心化的社交协议，用户可以通过该协议发布内容、与其他用户互动，从而真正解决了审查制度的灾难滑坡。Nostr 的出现吸引了大量用户的关注和参与，一时间名声大噪。
然而，Nostr 也因其争议性内容而被 Twitter 现任 CEO Elon Musk 封杀。这一事件还引发了社交媒体审查和言论自由的争议。但是，Twitter 前任 CEO Jack Dorsey 对 Nostr 表示了支持，并自掏 14 BTC 为其提供资助。这一举动引起了业内人士的热议，也给了 Nostr 更多的曝光度和发展机会。
Nostr 的爆火和争议引起了人们对于去中心化社交协议的关注和讨论的同时， 让我们回过头来看看 Nostr 背后的开发者 Fiatjaf 对于极客精神的推崇，以及他对他之前深耕的比特币生态的一些观点。
II. 什么是 Nostr？
Nostr 是一个最简化的协议，它能够一劳永逸地创建一个抗审查的全球“社交”网络。Nostr 不依赖于任何受信中央服务器，其基于密码学密钥和签名，并且不依赖于 P2P 技术，它也不会发行 Token。
那它的运作原理是怎样的呢？简单来说：每个人都运行一个客户端，这可以是本机客户端、Web 客户端等。要发布某些内容（比如一个帖子），你要用你的密钥对其签名，并将其发送到多个中继器（由其他人或你自己托管的服务器）。要从其他人那里获得更新，你可以询问多个中继器是否了解这些其他人。任何人都可以运行中继器，这是非常简单的，除了接受某些人的帖子并转发给其他人之外，它什么都不做。我们也不需要信任中继器，签名是在客户端进行验证的。
由于 Nostr 的开发者 Fiatjaf 同时也是比特币和闪电网络的开发者，因此 Nostr 原生支持闪电网络。闪电网络速度非常快，性能非常强，能够承载高并发应用，这样的结合为 Nostr 上的应用带来了强有力的支撑。
Nostr 协议为去中心化社交提供了乐高积木。作为一个精细设计的基础设施，就可以让隐秘的超级开发者们搭建出超越想象而又极具比特币内核的产品。这就是 Nostr 协议的魔力所在！
III. Nostr 去中心化社交协议的爆火
Nostr 之所以能够爆火，主要是因为它提供了一种全新的社交媒体体验，并且将比特币精神和区块链技术与社交媒体结合在一起。
所以真正导致 Nostr 爆火的因素有以下几点：
● 去中心化，Nostr 不被任何中央机构或公司所控制。相反，网络只是独立运行的数据中继器（服务器）的集合。这意味着 Nostr 作为一个整体不易受到任何单一实体的审查或操纵。这对社交媒体审查和言论自由的保护性极具特点，也就是吸引了更多人的关注和关心原因之一。
● 匿名，与许多社交媒体平台不同，Nostr 不会收集用户数据并将其出售给第三方广告商。没有电子邮件地址、电话号码或政府身份与 Nostr 账户相关联。就像比特币一样，该系统只通过公钥和加密签名来验证数据的有效性。这味着用户可以完全掌控自己的数据和隐私。这就吸引了很多关注隐私保护的用户。
● 货币化，Nostr 为内容创作者提供了独特的货币化系统。与其他社交媒体平台依靠广告收入来支付内容创作者不同，Nostr 允许内容创作者直接将其内容货币化，粉丝可以打赏小费（又称「zaps」）。Nostr 基础设施供应商同样可以通过闪电网络支付将他们提供的服务货币化。但也要归功于 Fiatjaf 曾经在构建闪电网络时所掌握的经验，这使得用户可以在 Nostr 上进行快速、便捷的交易，也增加了 Nostr 的用户体验。
● 开源，Nostr 代码可供任何人查看、使用和修改。这允许在协议的开发中实现透明与协作。任何人都可以为 Nostr 的开发做出贡献，社区可以共同合作，逐步改进该协议。Nostr 的设计具有灵活性和适应性，可以不断发展以满足用户需求。它会让用户感受到自己拥有并投资了这一协议，这对协议的长期成功至关重要。
Nostr 的爆火是由多方面因素共同作用的结果。它的去中心化、货币化、闪电网络支付、互动性和争议性等特点吸引了大量用户的关注和参与。正是因为这些因素的构成，Nostr 也为比特币和区块链技术在社交媒体领域的应用提供了新的范例，这就是技术的魅力，也是 Fiatjaf 极客精神的一种展现！
IV. Nostr 创始人对 Drivechain 的高度认可
不管是 Nostr 还是比特币，始终都逃不了一个问题。拿 Nostr 来说，当 Nostr 的日活跃用户接近 10 万时。由于中继提供动力的基础设施承载的压力变得较大，开发者就需要实施 CDN 和图像优化器，以减少带宽使用，好让 Nostr 协议变得流畅。所以大家应该明白我要说的是什么了，没错就是扩容的问题。至于 Nostr 的扩容问题我们暂时不议，当其生态到达一定规模之后应该会有新的方案出现，而比特币的扩容问题现在确实才是一件当务之急的大事。
前面说过匿名开发者 Fiatjaf 不仅是 Nostr 的 Builder，也是比特币的早期开发者，也为闪电网络社区的 LNURL 做过贡献。他还创建了中心化的以太坊应用 Etleneum ，利用闪电网络提高比特币付款的速度和可扩展性。与其他许多比特币用户一样，Fiatjaf 不想透露自己的真实姓名。他可能是在坚定自己的心中那份难得的比特币精神。
因为过去的架构经验，Fiatjaf 对比特币扩容的一些观点有着不可置疑的权威性以及建设性。在众多比特币扩容方案中 Fiatjaf 对 Drivechain 似乎是格外看好的，他认为可以通过 BIP-301 机制或 Spacechains 机制来完成 Drivechain 的概念。
因此，Fiatjaf 的支持和认可不仅反映了 Drivechain 在比特币社区中的价值和创新性，也体现了 Paul Sztorc 所带领的 LayerTwo Labs 团队在比特币未来技术发展和创新方面的重要贡献。这里要申明的一点是 Fiatjaf 和 Paul Sztorc 本人包括其团队（ LayerTwo Labs ）并没有任何的商业往来，所以我们看得出他们之间更多的可能是技术极客对彼此的那种心心相惜，也证明了 Drivechain 方案的技术“优越性”！
Fiatjaf 认为 Drivechain 可以解决目前比特币所面临的所有问题，Drivechain 可以使比特币的实验和新用例成为更多可能，比如发行 Token、隐私交易、智能合约、图灵完备性、Gamefi、DeFi 、预言机等等，这些都是一些非常有价值的生态布局，但从来没有在比特币生态中真正落地过，因为以上所说的这些在比特币上并不能完全实现。它们要么用概念欺骗用户，要么被归入 Liquid 或 RSK 这样的托管方案，从而无法真正获得相应的网络效应。
不同的是开发者可以采用 Drivechain 方案根据各种不同的应用场景，创建各种基于 Drivechain 的侧链，那么所有这些用户群体都可以同时得到满足。而所有场景在侧链中实现的同时，侧链也对比特币主链并没有任何危害，Drivechain 似乎在完成任务的同时也解决了比特币 "扩容"问题、区块链的安全预算问题以及让比特币更加去中心化。
这就不难看出 Fiatjaf 为什么一再看好并推崇 Drivechain，比特币生态的叙事想要更上一层，势必需要 Drivechain 方案的介入，而这个日子我想也不会太远。
V. 总结
有时候针对一个事务的难点可能会有成千上百个人花费十年甚至更多时间要去攻克它，其意义就是它的存在或着诞生是能解决更多更大的问题，被惠及之人将它奉为解放和革命的象征。如今在 Web3 行业飞速发展的今天 k 比特币生态的发展刻不容缓。Drivechain 的出现对于比特币生态系统来说是非常必要的。它可以为比特币网络提供可扩展性和创新性，同时还 k 以保障比特币主链的安全性，可以说是全方位的满足了比特币生态的发展，从而推动整个生态的发展和壮大。
我相信随着 Drivechain 方案的介入，比特币生态会也将迎来一片繁荣。届时 Drivechain 虽然不能像 Nostr 一样全网迅速爆火，但它将会比 Nostr“火的”更持久，如比特币那样！
特别注释：
1):Nostr 是一个极简的去中心化社交协议，其不依赖任何中心化服务器，客户端信息发布和传递由互不通信的中继端来完成，信息的发布和传输具有抗审查性。任何用户都可以创建公私钥，而无需依赖于特定的社交账号或域名，使得用户入驻更加简便且摆脱了来自第三方服务器的限制。获得了比特币社区的追捧，当时遭到了 Twitter 现任 CEO Elon Musk 的封杀，同时也让 Twitter 前任 CEO Jack Dorsey 自掏 14 BTC 为其提供资助。
2):Fiatjaf 是一名匿名开发者，他是 Nostr 的开发者同时也是比特币和闪电网络的开发者。
3):Fiatjaf 认为 Drivechain 将给比特币生态带来新范式。
引用参考：
1):https://fiatjaf.com/drivechain.html（Fiatjaf 对 Drivechain 发表的看法原文）
2):https://foresightnews.pro/article/detail/24607
3):https://twitter.com/fiatjaf
4):https://link3.cc/layertwolabs
下面是 Fiatjaf 对 Drivechain 发表看法的原文（以下文章附带了英文原版以及中文翻译，还有对应可以跳转到原文的链接）：
Understanding Drivechain requires a shift from the paradigm most bitcoiners are used to. It is not about “trustlessness” or “mathematical certainty”, but game theory and incentives. (Well, Bitcoin in general is also that, but people prefer to ignore it and focus on some illusion of trustlessness provided by mathematics.)
Here we will describe the basic mechanism (simple) and incentives (complex) of“hashrate escrow”and how it enables a 2-way peg between the mainchain (Bitcoin) and various sidechains.
The full concept of “Drivechain” also involves blind merged mining (i.e., the sidechains mine themselves by publishing their block hashes to the mainchain without the miners having to run the sidechain software), but this is much easier to understand and can be accomplished either bythe BIP-301 mechanismor bythe Spacechains mechanism.
理解 Drivechain（驱动链）需要改变大多数比特币玩家习惯的范式。它不是关于 "不可信任 "或 "数学上的确定性"，而是关于博弈论和激励。(一般来说比特币也是这样的，但人们更愿意忽略它本身，而专注于数学提供的一些不信任的假象)。
在这里，我们将描述 "hashrate escrow "的基本机制（简单）和激励机制（复杂），以及它如何实现主链（比特币）和各种侧链之间的双向挂钩。
"Drivechain "的完整概念还涉及到盲目合并挖矿（即侧链通过向主链发布其区块哈希值来自行挖矿，矿工无需运行侧链软件），但这更容易理解，可以通过 BIP-301 机制或 Spacechains 机制来完成。
How does hashrate escrow work from the point of view of Bitcoin?
A new address type is created. Anything that goes in that is locked and can only be spent if all miners agree on the Withdrawal Transaction (WT^) that will spend it for 6 months. There is one of these special addresses for each sidechain.
To gather miners’ agreementbitcoindkeeps track of the “score” of all transactions that could possibly spend from that address. On every block mined, for each sidechain, the miner can use a portion of their coinbase to either increase the score of oneWT^by 1 while decreasing the score of all others by 1; or they can decrease the score of allWT^s by 1; or they can do nothing.
Once a transaction has gotten a score high enough, it is published and funds are effectively transferred from the sidechain to the withdrawing users.
If a timeout of 6 months passes and the score doesn’t meet the threshold, thatWT^is discarded.
从比特币的角度来看，哈希率托管是如何工作的？
一个新的地址类型被创建。任何进入该地址的事物都会被锁定，只有在所有矿工都同意提现交易（WT^）的情况下才能花掉，而提现交易需要 6 个月。每条侧链都有一个这样的特殊地址。
为了收集矿工的同意，bitcoind 记录了所有可能从该地址支出的交易的 "分数"。在每一个开采的区块中，对每一条侧链，矿工可以用他们的一部分 coinbase 来增加一个 WT^的分数，同时减少其他所有 WT^的分数，或者他们可以减少所有 WT^的分数，或者他们可以不做任何事情。
一旦一个交易得到了足够高的分数，它就会被公布，资金就会有效地从侧链转移到提现用户手中。
如果 6 个月的超时时间过去，分数没有达到阈值，该 WT^就会被丢弃。
What does the above procedure mean?
It means that people can transfer coins from the mainchain to a sidechain by depositing to the special address. Then they can withdraw from the sidechain by making a special withdraw transaction in the sidechain.
The special transaction somehow freezes funds in the sidechain while a transaction that aggregates all withdrawals into a single mainchainWT^, which is then submitted to the mainchain miners so they can start voting on it and finally after some months it is published.
Now the crucial part: the validity of theWT^is not verified by the Bitcoin mainchain rules, i.e., if Bob has requested a withdraw from the sidechain to his mainchain address, but someone publishes a wrongWT^that instead takes Bob’s funds and sends them to Alice’s main address there is no way the mainchain will know that. What determines the “validity” of theWT^is the miner vote score and only that. It is the job of miners to vote correctly – and for that they may want to run the sidechain node in SPV mode so they can attest for the existence of a reference to theWT^transaction in the sidechain blockchain (which then ensures it is ok) or do these checks by some other means.
上述程序意味着什么？
它意味着人们可以通过向特殊地址存款，将 Coin 从主链转移到侧链。然后，他们可以通过在侧链上进行特殊的提现交易来从侧链上提款。
特殊交易在某种程度上冻结了侧链中的资金，而将所有提现汇总到一个主链 WT^的交易，然后提交给主链矿工，让他们开始投票，并在几个月后公布。
现在最关键的部分是：WT^的有效性不被比特币主链规则所验证，也就是说，如果 Bob 要求从侧链提现到他的主链地址，但有人发布了一个错误的 WT^，反而把 Bob 的资金送到了 Alice 的主链地址，主链不可能知道这点。只有矿工的投票分数决定 WT^的 "有效性 "。矿工的工作是正确投票--为此他们可能想在 SPV 模式下运行侧链节点，这样他们就可以证明侧链区块链中存在对 WT^交易的引用（这样就可以确保它是正确的），或者通过一些其他方式进行这些检查。
What? 6 months to get my money back?
Yes. But no, in practice anyone who wants their money back will be able to use an atomic swap, submarine swap or other similar service to transfer funds from the sidechain to the mainchain and vice-versa. The long delayed withdraw costs would be incurred by few liquidity providers that would gain some small profit from it.
需要 6 个月才能拿回属于你的钱？
对，但也不对，因为在实践中，任何想拿回自己钱的人都可以使用原子交换、潜交换或其他类似的服务，将资金从侧链转移到主链，反之亦然。长时间的延迟提现成本将由少数流动性提供商承担，他们将获得小额利润。
Why bother with this at all?
Drivechains solve many different problems:
It enables experimentation and new use cases for Bitcoinpoo
Issued assets, fully private transactions, stateful blockchain contracts, turing-completeness, decepo ontralized games, some “DeFi” aspects, prediction markets, futarchy, decentralized and yet meaningful human-readable names, big blocks with a ton of normal transactions on them, a chain optimized only for Lighting-style networks to be built on top of it.
These are some ideas that may have merit to them, but were never actually tried because they couldn’t be tried with real Bitcoin or inferfacing with real bitcoins. They were either relegated to the shitcoin territory or to custodial solutions like Liquid or RSK that may have failed to gain network effect because of that.
为什么要这样做呢？
Drivechains 可以解决许多不同的问题：
它使比特币的实验和新用例成为可能
发行的资产、完全私有的交易、有状态的区块链合约、图灵完备性、去中心化的游戏、一些 "DeFi "方面、预测市场、去中心化但又有意义的人类可读名称、有大量正常交易的大区块、只为在其上建立闪电式网络而优化的链。
这些都是一些可能有价值的想法，但从来没有真正尝试过，因为它们不能用真正的比特币来尝试或干扰。它们要么被归入屎币领域，要么被归入 Liquid 或 RSK 这样的托管方案，可能因此而无法获得网络效应。
It solves conflicts and infighting
Some people want fully private transactions in a UTXO model, others want “accounts” they can tie to their name and build reputation on top; some people want simple multisig solutions, others want complex code that reads a ton of variables; some people want to put all the transactions on a global chain in batches every 10 minutes, others want off-chain instant transactions backed by funds previously locked in channels; some want to spend, others want to just hold; some want to use blockchain technology to solve all the problems in the world, others just want to solve money.
With Drivechain-based sidechains all these groups can be happy simultaneously and don’t fight. Meanwhile they will all be using the same money and contributing to each other’s ecosystem even unwillingly, it’s also easy and free for them to change their group affiliation later, which reduces cognitive dissonance.
它解决了冲突和内讧
有些人希望在 UTXO 模式下进行完全私人的交易，有些人则希望 "账户 "可以和他们的名字绑定，并在上面建立声誉；有些人希望有简单的 multisig 解决方案，有些人则希望有复杂的代码来读取大量的变量；有些人希望每 10 分钟分批将所有的交易放在全球链上，有些人则希望在链外进行即时交易，并由之前锁定在渠道中的资金支持；有些人想消费，有些人只想持有；有些人想用区块链技术来解决世界上的所有问题，有些人只想解决资金问题。
有了基于 Drivechain 的侧链，所有这些群体都可以同时得到满足。此外，他们都会使用同样的资金，并为对方的生态系统做出贡献，即使是不情愿的，他们以后改变自己的群体归属也很容易，这就减少了认知上的不协调。
It solves “scaling”
Multiple chains like the ones described above would certainly do a lot to accommodate many more transactions that the current Bitcoin chain can. One could have special Lightning Network chains, but even just big block chains or big-block-mimblewimble chains or whatnot could probably do a good job. Or even something less cool like 200 independent chains just like Bitcoin is today, no extra features (and you can call it “sharding”), just that would already multiply the current total capacity by 200.
Use your imagination.
它解决了 "扩容"问题
像上面描述的那样的多条链，肯定会做很多事情来容纳更多的交易，而目前的比特币链可以做到。我们可以有特殊的闪电网络链，但即使只是大区块链或大区块-混沌链或其它链，也可能做得很好。或者甚至是那些听起来不那么厉害的事物，比如 200 条独立的链，就像今天的比特币一样，没有额外的功能（你可以称之为 "分片"），只是这已经将目前的总容量乘以 200 了。
所以，请发挥您的想象力。
It solves the blockchain security budget issue
The calculation is simple: you imagine what security budget is reasonable for each block in a world without block subsidy and divide that for the amount of bytes you can fit in a single block: that is the price to be paid in satoshis per byte. In reasonable estimative, the price necessary for every Bitcoin transaction goes to very large amounts, such that not only any day-to-day transaction has insanely prohibitive costs, but also Lightning channel opens and closes are impracticable.
So without a solution like Drivechain you’ll be left with only one alternative: pushing Bitcoin usage to trusted services like Liquid and RSK or custodial Lightning wallets. With Drivechain, though, there could be thousands of transactions happening in sidechains and being all aggregated into a sidechain block that would then pay a very large fee to be published (via blind merged mining) to the mainchain. Bitcoin security guaranteed.
它解决了区块链的安全预算问题
计算方法很简单：请想象一下，在没有区块补贴的世界里，每个区块的安全预算是多少，然后把它除以一个区块所能容纳的字节数：这就是每个字节所要支付的价格（Satoshi 聪）。在合理的估计中，每笔比特币交易所需的价格会达到非常大的数额，这样一来，不仅任何日常交易都会有疯狂的成本，而且闪电通道的开启和关闭也是不可行的。
因此，如果没有像 Drivechain 这样的解决方案，我们将只剩下一个选择：将比特币的使用推给 Liquid 和 RSK 这样值得信赖的服务或托管的 Lightning 钱包。不过，有了 Drivechain，可能会有成千上万的交易发生在侧链上，并被全部汇总到侧链区块中，然后支付非常大的费用被发布到主链上（通过盲目合并采矿）。因此，比特币的安全性得到保证。
It keeps Bitcoin decentralized
Once we have sidechains to accomodate the normal transactions, the mainchain functionality can be reduced to be only a “hub” for the sidechains’ comings and goings, and then the maximum block size for the mainchain can be reduced to, say, 100kb, which would make running a full node very very easy.
它使比特币保持去中心化
一旦我们有了侧链来容纳正常的交易，主链的功能就可以减少到只作为侧链来往的 "枢纽"，然后主链的最大区块大小可以减少到，如 100kb，这将使运行一个完整的节点非常非常容易。
Can miners steal?
Yes. If a group of coordinated miners are able to secure the majority of the hashpower and keep their coordination for 6 months, they can publish a WT^ that takes the money from the sidechains and pays to themselves.
矿工可以盗窃吗？
可以。如果一组协调的矿工能够确保大多数时候下的哈希功率，并保持协调工作 6 个月，他们可以发布一个提现交易，从侧链上取钱并支付给自己。
Will miners steal?
No, because the incentives are such that they won’t.
Although it may look at first that stealing is an obvious strategy for miners as it is free money, there are many costs involved:
1.The cost of ceasing blind-merged mining returns – as stealing will kill a sidechain, all the fees from it that miners would be expected to earn for the next years are gone;
2.The cost of community goodwill – when participating in a steal operation, a miner will suffer a ton of backlash from the community, which is not something to be ignored. If they are public entities they can be physically harassed, receive death threats, or be persecuted by the State justice system;
3.The cost of coordination – assuming miners are just normal businesses, they just want to do their work and get paid, but stealing from a Drivechain will require coordination with other miners to conduct an immoral act in a way that has many pitfalls and is likely to be broken over the months;
4.The cost of miners leaving your mining pool: when we talked about “miners” above we were actually talking about mining pools operators, so they must also consider the risk of miners migrating from their mining pool to others as they begin the process of stealing;
5.The cost of Bitcoin price going down: If a steal is successful that will mean Drivechains are not safe, therefore Bitcoin is less useful, and miner credibility will also be hurt, which are likely to cause the Bitcoin price to go down, which in turn may kill the miners’ businesses and savings;
6.Another small way the community goodwill can end up affecting self-interested miners is that if they attempt to steal, even if failing at the end, that will contribute to growing concerns over exaggerated miners power over the Bitcoin ecosystem, which may end up causing the community to agree on a hard-fork to change the mining algorithm in the future, or to do something to increase participation of more entities in the mining process (such as development or cheapment of new ASICs), which have a chance of decreasing the profits of current miners.
Another point to take in consideration is that one may be inclined to think a newly-created sidechain or a sidechain with relatively low usage may be more easily stolen from, since the blind merged mining returns from it (point 1 above) are going to be small – but the fact is also that a sidechain with small usage will also have less money to be stolen from, and since the other costs besides 1 are less elastic at the end it will not be worth stealing from these too.
All of the above consideration are valid only if miners are stealing from good sidechains. If there is a sidechain that is doing things wrong, scamming people, not being used at all, or is full of bugs, for example, that will be perceived as a bad sidechain, and then miners can and will safely steal from it and kill it, which will be perceived as a good thing by everybody.
那么，矿工会作恶吗？
不会，因为激励机制的存在。
虽然一开始看起来盗窃是矿工的明显策略，但这里面涉及许多成本：
停止盲目合并挖矿收益的成本--由于偷窃会毁掉一条侧链，矿工在未来几年内有望从中获得的所有费用都会消失； 社区商誉的成本--当参与偷窃行为时，矿工将遭受来自社区的大量反击，这是不容忽视的。如果他们是公共实体，他们会受到人身骚扰，收到死亡威胁，或受到国家司法系统的迫害； 协调的成本--假设矿工是正常的企业，他们只想做自己的工作并获得报酬，但从 Drivechain 上偷窃将需要与其他矿工协调来进行不道德的行为，这种方式有很多隐患，很可能在几个月内被打破； 矿工离开矿池的成本：当我们在上面谈到 "矿工 "时，我们实际上是在谈论矿池运营商，所以他们也必须考虑矿工在开始偷窃过程中从他们的矿池迁移到其他矿池的风险； 比特币价格下跌的代价：如果偷窃成功，那就意味着 Drivechain 不安全，因此比特币的作用就会降低，矿工的信誉也会受到伤害，这些都有可能导致比特币价格下跌，进而可能扼杀矿工的生意和存款； 社区的善意最终可能影响到自利的矿工的另一个方法是，如果他们试图偷窃，即使最后失败了，这将促使人们对矿工在比特币生态系统的权力越来越担心，这可能最终导致社区同意在未来改变挖矿算法的硬分叉，或做一些事情来增加更多实体参与挖矿过程（如开发或使用廉价的新 ASIC），这有可能减少当前矿工的利益。
另一个需要考虑的问题是，人们可能倾向于认为一条新创建的侧链或使用率相对较低的侧链可能更容易被盗，因为它的盲目合并挖矿收益（上述第 1 点）会很小--但事实也是，一条使用率低的侧链也会有较少的钱被盗，而且由于除 1 之外的其他成本最终弹性较小，所以也不值得从这些侧链上偷窃。
所有上述考虑只有在矿工从优质侧链中偷窃时才有效。例如，如果有一条侧链正在做错事、欺骗人们、根本不被使用，或者充满了漏洞，这将被认为是一条劣质侧链，然后矿工可以而且会安全地从它那里偷窃并销毁它，这将被大家认为是一件好事。
What do we do if miners steal?
Paul Sztorc has suggested in the past that a user-activated soft-fork could prevent miners from stealing, i.e., most Bitcoin users and nodes issue a rulesimilar to this oneto invalidate the inclusion of a faulty WT^ and thus cause any miner that includes it in a block to be relegated to their own Bitcoin fork that other nodes won’t accept.
This suggestion has made people think Drivechain is a sidechain solution backed by user-actived soft-forks for safety, which is very far from the truth. Drivechains must not and will not rely on this kind of soft-fork, although they are possible, as the coordination costs are too high and no one should ever expect these things to happen.
If even with all the incentives against them (see above) miners do still steal from a good sidechain that will mean the failure of the Drivechain experiment. It will very likely also mean the failure of the Bitcoin experiment too, as it will be proven that miners can coordinate to act maliciously over a prolonged period of time regardless of economic and social incentives, meaning they are probably in it just for attacking Bitcoin, backed by nation-states or something else, and therefore no Bitcoin transaction in the mainchain is to be expected to be safe ever again.
如果矿工盗窃，我们该怎么做？
过去，Paul Sztorc 曾建议，用户激活的软分叉可以防止矿工偷窃，也就是说，大多数比特币用户和节点发布一个类似的规则，使有问题的提现交易所包含的内容无效，从而导致任何在区块中包含它的矿工被降级为他们自己的比特币分叉，并不获得其它节点的接纳。
这个建议让人们认为 Drivechain 是一个由用户行为的软分叉支持的安全的侧链解决方案，这与事实相差甚远。Drivechain 绝不能也不会依赖这种软分叉，尽管它们是可能的，但因为协调成本太高，这种事情最好不要发生。
如果矿工们在所有的激励措施下（见上文）仍然从一条优质侧链中偷窃，这将意味着 Drivechain 实验的失败。这也很可能意味着比特币实验的失败，因为它将被证明，矿工可以在很长一段时间内协调恶意行为，而不考虑经济和社会激励，这意味着他们可能只是为了攻击比特币，得到民族国家或其他东西的支持，因此主链上的任何比特币交易都将不再安全。
Why use this and not a full-blown trustless and open sidechain technology?
Because it is impossible.
If you ever heard someone saying “just use a sidechain”, “do this in a sidechain” or anything like that, be aware that these people are either talking about “federated” sidechains (i.e., funds are kept in custody by a group of entities) or they are talking about Drivechain, or they are disillusioned and think it is possible to do sidechains in any other manner.
为什么要使用它而不是全面的无信任和开放的侧链技术？
因为这是不可能的。
如果你曾经听到有人说 "只要使用侧链"，"在侧链中做这个 "或类似的话，请注意，这些人要么是在谈论 "联合 "侧链（即资金由一组实体保管），要么是在谈论 Drivechain，要么是幻想破灭，认为以其他任何方式做侧链都是可能的。
No, I mean a trustless 2-way peg with correctness of the withdrawals verified by the Bitcoin protocol!
That is not possible unless Bitcoin verifies all transactions that happen in all the sidechains, which would be akin to drastically increasing the blocksize and expanding the Bitcoin rules in tons of ways, i.e., a terrible idea that no one wants.
不，我的意思是一个无信任的双向挂钩、提现的正确性由比特币协议来验证！
这是不可能的，除非比特币验证所有侧链中发生的所有交易，这就相当于大幅增加区块大小，并以大量方式扩大比特币规则，也就是说，这是无人认可的可怕的想法。
What about the Blockstream sidechains whitepaper?
Yes, that was a way to do it. The Drivechain hashrate escrow is a conceptually simpler way to achieve the same thing with improved incentives, less junk in the chain, more safety.
Blockstream 侧链白皮书呢？
是的，那是一种方法。Drivechain 哈希率托管是一种概念上更简单的方式，以改善激励机制，减少链上垃圾，更安全地实现同样的事情。
Isn’t the hashrate escrow a very complex soft-fork?
Yes, but it is much simpler than SegWit. And, unlike SegWit, it doesn’t force anything on users, i.e., it isn’t a mandatory blocksize increase.
哈希率托管不是一个非常复杂的软分叉吗？
是的，但它比 SegWit 要简单得多。而且，与 SegWit 不同，它不会强迫用户做任何事情，也就是说，它不会强制性地增加区块大小。
Why should we expect miners to care enough to participate in the voting mechanism?
Because it’s in their own self-interest to do it, and it costs very little. Today over half of the miners mine RSK. It’s not blind merged mining, it’sa very convoluted process that requires them to run a RSK full node.For the Drivechain sidechains, an SPV node would be enough, or maybe just getting data from a block explorer API, so much much simpler.
为什么我们要期望矿工关心并参与投票机制？
因为这样做符合他们自己的利益，而且成本很低。今天，超过一半的矿工都在开采 RSK。这不是盲目的合并挖矿，这是一个非常复杂的过程，需要他们运行一个 RSK 全节点。对于 Drivechain 侧链来说，一个 SPV 节点就足够了，或者可能只是从区块探索者 API 中获取数据，这样就简单多了。
What if I still don’t like Drivechain even after reading this?
That is the entire point! You don’t have to like it or use it as long as you’re fine with other people using it. The hashrate escrow special addresses will not impact you at all, validation cost is minimal, and you get the benefit of people who want to use Drivechain migrating to their own sidechains and freeing up space for you in the mainchain. See also the point above about infighting.
如果我看完后这些仍然不喜欢 Drivechain 呢？
这就是问题的关键所在：你不需要喜欢它，也不需要使用它，只要你对其他人使用它没有意见。哈希率托管的特殊地址根本不会影响到你，验证成本最低，而且你可以得到想要使用 Drivechain 的人迁移到他们自己的侧链的好处，在主链上为你腾出空间。也请看上面关于内讧的观点。
原文链接：https://fiatjaf.com/drivechain.html
About LayerTwo Labs
LayerTwo Labs 是由 Paul Sztorc（前耶鲁大学统计学家）创立的 sidechain 开发公司，我们将给大家提供更多的技术知识科普。https://link3.cc/layertwolabs
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